ITQ's in Chile: Measuring the Economic Benefits of Reform by Andrés Gomez-Lobo et al.
  1 
 















In 2001 an individual (operationally transferable) quota system was introduced for all the most important 
industrial fisheries in Chile. This system was put in place after years of declining stocks and over investment. 
In this paper we describe this reform and estimate related allocative efficiency benefits for the most important 
industrial fishery in the country, the southern pelagic fishery. Benefits were estimated using a bioeconomic 
model  and  Monte  Carlo  techniques.  This  approach  allows  benefits  to  be  estimated  using  more  realistic 
counterfactual scenarios than just comparing the fishery before and after the reform. Estimated discounted net 
benefits reach US$123 to US$366 million in the period 2001 to 2020. Fleet size fell from 148 active boats in 
2000 to 65 in 2002 as a direct consequence of the reform. Among the interesting features of the recent 
Chilean experience is the way the political economy of the reform was facilitated by the prior introduction of 
de facto individual quotas within the framework of fishery research activities. When the authorities closed the 
southern  pelagic  fishery  because  of  biological  problems  between  1997  and  2000,  they  organized 
‘experimental’ fishing expeditions in which participant boats were given the right to fish a certain amount of 
resources per expedition. This pseudo quota system allowed fishermen to experience directly the benefits of 
individual quotas and that was instrumental to the political agreement leading to the reform. This successful 
gradual approach may be of interest to other countries planning to introduce individual quotas. Finally, it is 
important to note that the Chilean southern industrial pelagic fishery has average catches of over 1.4 million 
tons a year, making it one of the largest fisheries in the world to be regulated by individual quotas. 
 
 
JEL Classification: Q22  
 
Keywords: Bioeconomic model, pelagic fisheries, individual transferable quotas 
 
                                                           
† We thank Constanza Hill for her able research assistance in this paper. We gratefully acknowledge the 
financial support from the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico  y Tecnológico (FONDECYT project 
Nº1020765). We are also grateful to Institute for the Development of Fisheries (IFOP) for making the data 
available. 
a Department of Economics, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile (agomezlo@econ.uchile.cl). 
b Department of Economics, University Alberto Hurtado, ILADES-Georgetown University, Santiago, Chile 
(jpena@uahurtado.cl). 
c Fisheries Development Institute, Valparaíso, Chile. (pbarria@ifop.cl)   2 
1.  Introduction 
 
The fishing industry is one of the most important sectors of the Chilean economy. Yearly landings 
of fish averaged 5.4 million tons between 1993 and 2003 and exports of products directly related to 
the fishing industry, including fish meal and salmons from aquaculture, reached US$1.847 million 
in 2003, accounting for close to 10% of total exports that year.
1  
 
Until very recently the management of fisheries in Chile was for the most part based on the use of a 
yearly global quota (TAC), effort restrictions (licenses) and seasonal closure of fisheries justified on 
biological considerations. However, in 1991, during the debates surrounding the writing of a new 
fisheries  law, there was much  discussion  of introducing  an  individual transferable  quota (ITQ) 
system  to  avoid  the  emerging  problems  of  ‘racing’,  over  investment,  effort  distortions,  and 
declining length of fishing seasons.  
 
At the time it became political impossible to introduce ITQ’s due to the opposition of an important 
industrial group that was changing the focus of its activities from the north of the country to the 
south.
2 During the 1980’s the most important fishery was the northern pelagic fishery (see Figure 
1), based on the Anchovy (Engraulis ringens) and Spanish Sardine (Sardinops sagax), used in the 
production of fishmeal. Industrial catches of Spanish Sardine peaked in 1985 with 2.6 million tons 
(Barria  y  Serra,  1989).  However,  by  the  end  of  the  eighties  it  was  clear  that  this  fishery  was 
collapsing (landings reached 1.4 million tons by 1989 and have only averaged 123 thousand tons 
during the last ten years; Sernapesca, 2003). The center of gravity of the industry was now turning 
towards the southern pelagic fishery based on Jack Maquerel (Trachurus murphyi). The strategy of 
the industrial group owning the fleet and processing plants in the north was to migrate south and 
enter the emerging southern pelagic fishery. An ITQ system would have made this migration much 
more  costly,  if  not  impossible,  since  its  introduction  would  have  required  some  type  of 
granfathering in the allocation of initial quotas which would have forced newcomers without history 
in the fishery to pay to enter this fishery. Therefore, the industrial group of the north lobbied hard 
against an ITQ system, and won. 
 
                                                           
1 Fish landing data is from Sernapesca (2003). Export data was constructed by authors based on information 
from the Central Bank of Chile.  
2 However, the 1991 fisheries law did introduce ITQ’s for some minor fisheries that were closed due to 
previous over fishing. In the case of these fisheries, quotas were not allocated by historical rights but were 
actually tendered to the highest price bidder (Peña-Torres, 1997, 2002).   3 





(A): Northern Fishery 
(B): Southern Fishery 
 
 
During the nineties the southern pelagic fishery flourished. Although the number of licenses and 
storage  capacity  in  this  fishery  was  formally  fixed  in  1991,  fishing  boats  and  capacity  kept 
increasing through a series of loopholes in the regulations.
3 Potential fishing effort, measured by 
storage  capacity  of  the fleet,  grew  134%  between  1989  and  1995.  Landings  steadily  increased 
during this period, reaching a peak of 4 million tons in 1995.  
 
By the late nineties, it was evident that the southern fishery was in problems. The decline of stocks 
due to over fishing, together with a strong ‘El Niño’ phenomenon in 1997-1998, reduced the adult 
biomass considerably, and landings began to show an above average presence of juveniles. Storage 
capacity had kept increasing making over investment in the fishery acute.  
 
As a reaction to the increasing presence of juveniles in catches, the authorities closed the fishery 
starting in December 1997. However, the social and political impacts of a complete closure would 
have been enormous. Instead, the authorities devised a mechanism so that the fleet could continue 
to operate but in a controlled and orderly fashion that would not jeopardize the sustainability of the 
                                                           
3 For example, by licensing new boats in the Xth region, the southernmost part of the fishery.    4 
fishery. To this end, a series of ‘research’ or ‘experimental’ fishing expeditions were organized in 
the following three years. Participant boats had to sweep a pre-determined stretch of sea and locate 
existing schools of fish. This information was used by the authorities to gauge with more precision 
the level of biomass and its distribution. Once this was over, participant boats had the right to 
capture a pre-allocated per vessel quota of fish.  
 
These controlled fishing expeditions, besides reducing the effort exerted on the resource, operated 
in practice as a pseudo individual quota system that served to show companies the benefits of such a 
system. Compared to the previous ‘Olympic race’ for resources, the individual quotas assigned to 
participant ships during the ‘experimental’ fishing expeditions allowed fishermen to optimize the 
use of their fleet.
4  
 
By the year 2000 there was consensus among industry participants, and the authorities, that in order 
to lift the closure of the fishery, an individual quota system would have to be introduced. The 
stumbling  block  for  such  a  reform  was  the  difficulty  in  reaching  an  agreement  on  the  initial 
allocation of quotas.
5 An agreement was reached in the end and individual quotas were introduced 
for the most important industrial fisheries in Chile. They became operational in February 2001 and 
were initially given for a 2-year duration period. In 2002, a further reform extended these rights for 
10 more years and incorporated the northern pelagic fisheries as well.  
 
The effects of this quota system were instantaneous. The reform explicitly facilitated the merger of 
fishing  operations  of  fleets  from  different  companies,  a  sort  of  ‘operational  transferability’  of 
quotas. Very soon after the reform, the number of boats in operation was reduced drastically from 
148  in  2000  to  65 in 2002.  Also,  only  the  largest (from  500  to  1900  cubic meters  of  storage 
capacity) and newest boasts were kept active. Therefore, the excess capacity of the fleet was soon 
corrected, generating direct economic benefits in the form of lower operating costs. Another benefit 
of the reform was that due to the elimination of ‘racing for fish’, fishermen can now concentrate on 
catching less per trip, improving the quality of fish landings. This enabled the industry to allocate a 
higher percentage of landings to the higher value-added human consumption segment of the market, 
rather than to fishmeal production.     
                                                           
4 However, fishermen did not have total freedom to decide their fishing effort’s technological composition. 
During these years, the fishery regulator prioritized the allocation of fishing quotas to the relatively bigger 
industrial vessels which were previously operating in this fishery. 
5 To be politically acceptable grand fathering of rights was inevitable. However, the strategy followed by the 
authorities was to extract some of the rents generated in the fishery through an increase in the annual licensing 
fee. For more details on this, see Peña-Torres (2002a,b).    5 
In this paper, we describe the ITQ system introduced in Chile and offer a preliminary estimate of its 
direct allocative efficiency benefits. To this end we use a bioeconomic model of the Southern Jack 
Mackerel  fishery  to  generate  a  more  convincing  counterfactual  scenario  to  the  reform. 
Alternatively, we could have compared the fishery before and after the reform, but it is highly 
unlikely that the pre-reform situation would give a good indication of what would have happened 
without the reform. Over investment may have worsened, increasing the economic costs of the pre-
reform regulations. Also, the size and stability of the stock may have been more vulnerable in a pre-
reform situation. But most importantly, this fishery is subject to a number of other regulations such 
as vessel licensing and a TAC. The benefits of the reform depend on the type and level of these 
regulations adopted for the future. The correct way then to measure the benefits of the reform is to 
simulate the future evolution of the fishery under different scenarios and regulatory systems. Thus, 
in this paper we use a biological age-structured model for the Jack Mackerel (Trachurus murphyi) 
stock, an estimated stock-recruitment function for this resource, several functions determining fleet 
dynamics, and a catch function, to model the dynamics of the fishery.  
 
The parameters of these equations were estimated econometrically using data from 1985 to 2002 
(from 1975, in the case of the biological equations). The stock-recruitment relationship, the catch 
equation  and  the  fleet  dynamic  equations  all  have  random  shocks  whose  distributions  were 
estimated from the residuals of each individual equation. We then use Monte Carlo techniques, 
taking draws from these random shock distributions, to generate 100 possible future scenarios for 
the fishery with and without the reform introduced in 2001. Pair wise comparison of each scenario 
with and without the reform generates a distribution of the economic benefits of the introduction of 
the ITQ system in this fishery.  
 
The  results  show  that  the  direct  allocative  efficiency  benefits  of  the  reform  are  substantial. 
Depending on the scenario, the net discounted benefits, using a 10% discount rate over the 2001-
2020 period, are between US$123 and US$366 million.
6 These scenarios assume a TAC of 1.1 
million tons for the industrial fleet for each year, close to the current level set by the authorities for 
the  industrial  fleet.  The  results  are  not  very  sensitive  to  the  range  of  TACs  assumed  in  the 
simulations. 
                                                           
6 In Chile, social value discounting currently uses a 10% annual rate. The resulting net present values imply 
yearly net benefit flows of US$14.5 and US$43 million, respectively. Given that along the years 2002-2003 
the southern Jack Mackerel industrial fishery exported about US$230 million per year, the estimated net 
annual benefits of the ITQ reform correspond to about 6.3% - 18.7% of the annually exported value by this 
fishery.   6 
The paper is organized as follows. First we present a detailed description of the southern pelagic 
fishery in Chile. We then present a detailed description of the ITQ system introduced in 2001 and 
expanded in 2002. Following this we specify the bioeconomic model of the fishery and present the 
estimation results for each equation. The Monte Carlo results and the estimated benefits of the 
reform are then presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy lessons derived from 
the Chilean experience and possible directions for future research in this fishery.    
 
2.  The Southern Pelagic Fishery 
 
This fishery runs along the V
th to X
th Regions, from latitude 33ºS to 41ºS, although its main center 
of operation is in front of the Talcahuano area in the VIIIº region of the country (L36ºS; see Figure 
2), the zone where industrial fishing was first initiated around the mid 1940s. Industrial fishing has 
been historically concentrated on pelagic species used primarily for the production of fishmeal. 
Although in the early stages of this fishery the main targeted species were the Anchovy (Engraulis 
ringens)  and  Common  Sardine  (Clupea  bentincki),  since  the  early  1980s  the  Jack  Mackerel 
increasingly became the dominant species targeted by industrial vessels. Landings of Jack Mackerel 
accounted for 82% of the total industrial catch between 1985 and 2002, making it by far the central 
resource of this industrial fishery.
7 Of the total catch of Jack Mackerel within the Chilean EEZ, 
including non-industrial landings as well as industrial catches in other parts of the country, and also 
adding the catch caught by international vessels off the Chilean EEZ, the southern pelagic industrial 
fleet landed on average 64% of this species between 1985 and 2000. Thus, this fleet is by far the 
most important anthropogenic influence on this species.  
 
In the beginning of the eighties this fishery was in a strong development phase both in terms of 
fishing capacity and processing capacity (see Table 1). From 1980 to 1985 the number of industrial 
vessels more than doubled, while the storage capacity of the fleet more than quadrupled. In the 
following decade the storage capacity of the fleet again increased by a factor of four. This coincided 
with the introduction of larger vessels (with greater capacity of displacement) in the industrial fleet.
8 
In terms of the resulting fishing effort, there was an increase of 6.7 times between 1985 and 1995.
9 
                                                           
7  This  percentage is  even  higher,  88%, if the  average  is taken  between  1985  and  1997  before the  Jack 
Mackerel fishery was closed.  
8 The first ships over 790 m
3 of storage capacity initiated operations in this fishery during 1989. In 1995 the 
number of ships with a storage capacity greater than 790 m
3 represented 34% of the industrial fleet.  
9 The fishing effort index was constructed using the annual haul of the industrial fleet. That is, the sum over 
the whole fleet of the storage capacity of each individual ship (in m
3) multiplied by the days of fishing 
operations during each year.   7 
Table 1: The Southern Pelagic Industrial Fishery 
Fleet  Yearly Landings  
(millions of tons) 
Biomass  
(1,000 of tons) 
 
 






























1975    37  4,3          2.232 
1980    47  6,3          7.183 
1985  100,0  97  28,4  0,953  0,854    15.188 
1986  143,6  93  29,9  1,128  1,051    15.899 
1987  156,5  93  33,2  1,528  1,341    15.847 
1988  191,0  105  40,4  1,705  1,439    15.194 
1989  236,4  108  50,5  2,001  1,677    16.084 
1990  307,7  145  67,9  2,093  1,860  16.001  15.454 
1991  362,9  179  84,4  2,870  2,331  15.598  13.705 
1992  424,7  176  87,1  2,882  2,472  12.501  10.857 
1993  462,2  171  95,5  2,618  2,392  12.085  10.246 
1994  572,3  168  103,9  3,575  3,254  11.157    9.492 
1995  674,7  179  117,8  4,021  3,732    9.461    8.033 
1996  636,8  159  113,6  3,401  2,805  10.151    7.322 
1997  741,9  177  133,3  2,947  2,533    9.845    6.828 
1998  610,9  163  131,0  2,079  1,465  10.067    7.085 
1999  595,3  161  131,1  2,550  1,082    8.936    6.708 
2000  447,3  148  125,9  1,802  1,063    8.928    7.048 
2001  310,6  107  102,3  1,548  1,215  10.288    6.611 
2002  370,8  65  70,3  1,400  1,142    9.940    6.477 
(1) Annual haul (fishing days times storage capacity); index: 1985 = 100. (2) Number of industrial ships 
operating at least once during each year.  (3) Aggregate storage capacity in thousands of cubic meters. (4) 
Landings of the three main species (Common Sardine, Anchovy and Jack Mackerel). (6) and (7): Average 
annual biomass (recruits plus higher aged cohorts), (6) for the fishing grounds between the V
th and X
th  regions 
and (7) at the national level. Sources (1)–(7): National Fisheries Research Institute (IFOP). 
 
Total industrial pelagic landings grew uninterrupted until they reached a peak of 3.5 – 4 million 
tons in 1994 and 1995.
10  
 
From then on catches began to fall, partially coinciding with a very intense ‘El Niño’ phenomenon 
beginning in 1997 and lasting until the middle of 1998.
11 If we consider the three main species 
caught, the level of catches in 2002 were less than half the 1994-95 peak; in the case of the Jack 
Mackerel the drop was even greater.  
                                                           
10 Semi-industrial and artisanal fishermen landed another 0.5 million tons of these resources in both years. 
These fleets operate closer to the coast and capture mainly common sardine and anchovy.  
11  This  was  the  ‘El  Niño’  of  greatest  intensity  to  have  occurred  during  the  20
th  century.  However,  the 
consensus opinion in the fishing sector was that over-fishing during the previous years was much to blame for 
the falling catches, or at least in making the stock less resilient to oceanographic shocks such as ‘El Niño’.   8 
The  dynamics  just  described  for  the  annual  catch  was  preceded  by  a  similar  evolution  in  the 
available  biomass  of  the  three  main  species.  Columns  6 and  7  of  Table  1  present  the  official 
(IFOP’s) estimates of average yearly stock biomass for Jack Mackerel and the aggregate of the three 
main species. These estimates include recruits plus all higher aged cohorts. In the case of Jack 
Mackerel the estimates are for the total national biomass, while for the two other species it is an 
estimate of the stock in the central southern region.
12  
 
Beginning in November 1997 there is a reduction in the size and the annual haul of the industrial 
fleet in operation in the area. This tendency is related to the closed seasons introduced late in 1997 
and that limited the operational capacity of the fleet until the year 2001.  
 
From  November  1997  through  December  2000  a  biological  closure  was  imposed  on  the  Jack 
Mackerel fishery. The Anchovy and Sardine fishery had closed seasons from December to January 
(recruitment season) and from July to August (reproduction season) each year. 
 
During this period, the only possibility of capturing Jack Mackerel was to participate in one of the 
‘research’ fishing expeditions organized by the authorities. Boats that qualified ¾mainly those with 
more  than  700  cubic  meters  of  storage  capacity¾  had  to  sign  a  formal  agreement  with  the 
authorities. Those that would eventually participate were chosen at random from the list of qualified 
boats before each expedition.
13 
 
The research fishing expeditions consisted first of a search stage where boats had to follow a pre-
assigned path from the coast outwards in a zig-zag pattern whose length varied from 400 to 500 
nautical miles. Each ship had its own course to follow, which differed by 1º latitude from the other 
courses.  Figure  2  presents  an  example  of  the  design  of  an  expedition,  where  the  green  lines 
represent  the  charted  course  for  each  ship.  In  this  stage,  ships  had  to  detect  schools  of  Jack 
Mackerel, catch some fish and measure some environmental variables in order for the authorities to 
better gauge the size and distribution of the resource. Once this stage was completed, ships were 
allowed to fish a pre-assigned quota but only within some areas (square areas of between 50 and 
100 nautical miles) of their charted course (red squares in Figure 2). 
                                                           
12 Due to the geographic mobility of the Chilean Jack Mackerel stock, its biomass is estimated only at the 
national level. In contrast, the anchovy and common sardine do have biologically independent regional stocks 
along the coast of the country. 




In all 47 fishery expeditions were organized between November 1997 and December 2000. The 
number of ships that participated in each expedition varied from 3 (December 1997) to 117 (August 
1999). 
  
In February 2001, and as a direct consequence of the crisis that was affecting the fishery, an ITQ 
system  was  introduced.  This  reform  immediately  eliminated  the  ‘Olympic  race’  that  had 
characterized the fishery before the closures that started in 1997. The number of industrial vessels in 
operation dropped from 148 in 2000 to 65 in 2002.
14 The previous phase of research expeditions 
from 1997 to 2000¾although it helped to show fishermen the operational benefits of an individual 
quota system¾did not eliminate the over investment in the industry  for three reasons. First, a 
company would maximize its chances of participating in a research expedition in proportion to the 
number of qualified boats it had, so there were no incentives to reduce the number of boats (above 
                                                           
14 The speed by which the reform corrected the over investment problem of the fleet is somewhat obscured by 
the 2001 data. The quotas became operational in February of that year and most of the fleet operated in 
January 2001 without restrictions. Since our data is annual, the number of ships in operation in 2001 includes 
those that operated in January before the quota system came into operation. Thus a better measure of the 
impact of the reform is to compare the size of the fleet between the years 2000 and 2002.  
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700 cubic meters of storage capacity). Second, boats could still be used in the anchovy and sardine 
fishery, especially the smaller ones. Third, there was uncertainty as to the future regulation of the 
fishery. In this context, maintaining the whole fleet licensed and operational had an option value for 
companies due to the possibility that the fishery would be reopened in the future.  
  
3.  The ITQ system implemented in 2001 
 
The individual quota system introduced in February 2001 works as follows. The owners of licensed 
ships have a right to a certain percentage of each year’s annual TAC allocated to the industrial 
sector for each resource and fishery (expressed in tons).
15 The initial allocation rule determining the 
(fixed by law) percentage of the TAC for each owner varied slightly among fisheries. There were 
two basic rules. In some fisheries the initial percentages were set using a weighted average of the 
landings of the ships owned by each company between 1997 to 2000, relative to the total industrial 
landings for that period, and the storage capacity of each company’s fleet, relative to the total 
storage capacity in each fishery. In order to better explain this rule, let’s define citj, as the landings 
of ships owned by company i, in year t of species j. Similarly, define kij, as the storage capacity of 
ships owned by company i, in year t.
16 Then, the percentage of the industrial TAC of species j 





























                                                           
15 The annual TAC for each resource is first divided into a TAC for the industrial sector and a TAC for the 
artisanal sector. Industrial ships are prohibited from operating within the first 5 nautical miles off the coast 
where the artisanal fleet operates. 
16 The storage capacity of each ship was first adjusted to take account of the fact that some ships were only 
















where I is the total number of companies in the industry. 
 
The other initial allocation rule was just based on the landings of the species in the years 1999 and 






















In the Appendix we present the allocation rule used for each fishery in the country. Here it suffices 
to mention that the first allocation rule was used for the three species relevant for the southern 
pelagic fishery. 
 
Quotas  were  initially  set  for  two  years.  The  system  began  operating  in  February  2001,  but  in 
December 2002 a new law was passed extending the quotas for a ten year period (until 2012) and 
incorporating the northern pelagic fisheries as well. The extension of quotas for ten  years was 
justified by the argument that companies needed a longer horizon of secure ‘property rights’ over 
quotas in order to undertake investments.
17    
 
Naturally, the grandfathering nature of the initial allocation rule and the extension of quotas for a 
ten-year period meant that established fishermen would receive all of the resource rents of the 
fisheries. The authorities knew that any proposal to tender all or some of the quotas would derail the 
                                                           
17 A more detailed discussion about how Chilean fisheries law deals with the concept of ‘property rights’ over 
fishing quotas can be found at Peña-Torres (2002a and b).   12
reform.
18 However, they did manage to increase the licensing fee in the fishery in order to extract 
some of these rents.
19  
 
There are two ways in which quotas are transferable. First, the new law gives ample flexibility for 
companies to merge their fishing operations during a particular year. Thus, private agreements can 
be made to share or ‘rent’ the quotas for a period of time. Companies are not obliged to use all of 
their authorized ships, and ships not used during a particular year were initially exempted from the 
annual payment of the licensing fee.
20 Second, a ship can be irrevocably retired from the fishery. 
The  authorities  will  then give  the  owner  a  document  with  the  history  of  landings  and  storage 
capacity of that ship used to allocate the initial quota. This document, stipulating the individual 
quota associated with that ship, can be transferred to other ships of the company’s fleet or can be 
sold.
21     
 
Landings are monitored and audited by authorized private companies. Fishing companies must pay 
for this service and must have a landing report after each fishing trip. A company that does not 
inform its landings —or is caught discarding fish— losses 30% of its quota for that year.
22 If it 
informs its landings but does not obtain a certificate from an authorized auditor, it losses 10% of its 
yearly quota. If a company lands in excess of its quota in a given year it losses three times that 





                                                           
18 It is interesting to note, however, that in the ITQ system introduced in the 1991 law and later used in four 
small (but high value) industrial fisheries, individual quotas were tendered. As yet no academic description of 
this interesting experience has been forthcoming.  
19 As a reference about the magnitude of the increase in fishing licensing annual fees, total annual fiscal 
revenues related to them increased 80% between years 2000 and 2004 (in the case of the Southern Jack 
Mackerel fishery, this increase occurred in parallel with a basically constant volume of annual industrial 
landings). On the other hand, and considering annual values for year 2003, total licensing fees paid by all the 
industrial vessels operating under ITQs in Chile represented about 2% of the exporting value of the total 
annual landings of those fleets. (In this calculation we have included all industrial fisheries subject to ITQs).  
20 This exemption was valid only for the period 2001-2002 and it was thought as a way to secure support from 
the industry to the ITQ policy reform. Since January 2003 to date, all registered industrial vessels have to pay 
a annual license fee in a lump-sum fashion (this fee has to be paid independently of whether or not the vessel 
operates in a given year). 
21 However, the latter option has been barely used. The main reason for this is fishing companies’ perceived 
uncertainty about what will happen, once the 10-year validity of the current ITQ law expires, to the legal 
validity of the certificates informing the historical landings of each retired vessel. The current ITQ law has no 
explicit statement on this matter.   13
4.  Modeling the Jack Mackerel Fishery 
 
In order to obtain an estimate of direct allocative efficiency benefits of the reform, a bioeconomic 
model of the southern pelagic fishery is used. This model is composed of several equations that 
describe the evolution of key variables in the fishery, including an age structured biomass model, 
yearly recruitment of each species, the evolution of the fleet’s size (number of operating vessels) 
and composition (vessel types), fishing effort and yearly landings. The parameters of each equation 
were  estimated  using  data  for  the  fishery  from  1985  through  2002,  except  for  the  biological 
equations where data was available from 1975 for the case of Jack Mackerel.  
 
Originally, recruitment equations and an age structured model were also specified and estimated for 
Anchovy and Sardine. However, in the model we present below we do not simulate the evolution of 
these two species for two reasons. First, the biological data available for them begins only in 1991, 
thus much fewer data points were available to estimate reliable stock recruitment functions. Second 
and more important, the southern pelagic industrial fleet modelled in this study accounts only for a 
minor proportion of the overall landing of these two species, thus a model that only includes the 
southern industrial fleet would still leave out the most important influence on these stocks. Thus, in 
what follows we only present the model for the Jack Mackerel. Nonetheless, when comparing actual 
versus fitted values for this model in the 1985-2002 sample period, we used the actual catch of the 
other main pelagic species in order to estimate fleet total profitability.   
 
A Ricker  stock  recruitment  function  was  specified and  estimated  for the Jack  Mackerel.
23 The 
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where Rt is the number of recruits in year t, St-g is the biomass (in tons) of spawning adults in the 
population in the year t-g, where g is the age of recruits (g =2 years in the case of Jack Mackerel). 
The estimated parameters are presented in Table 2.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 If it does not have sufficient quota left that year, next year’s quota is reduced. 
23 The Ricker model is normally used for species with highly fluctuating recruitment, involving high fecundity 
as well as high natural mortality rates. Under favourable environmental conditions, species of this type can 
rapidly increase the range of their geographical distribution (for more details, see Yepes 2004, Begon and 
Mortimer 1986, and Haddon 2001).    14
Table 2: Estimated stock recruitment function for Jack Mackerel 
  Jack Mackerel 
a  11.0430 
b  -1.94 E-07 
R
2  0.66 
Data years  1975-2002 
Estimation technique  OLS on the log transformed model 
Dependent variable  Ln (Rt/St-2) 
Note: all estimated coefficients were highly significant statistically. 
 
The biomass evolves according to the following age structured model: 
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where Bct is the biomass of cohort c in year t, Nct is the number of individuals of cohort c in year t, 
Wct is the average weight of an individual of cohort c in year t, Mc is the natural mortality of cohort 
c (assumed constant through time) and Fct-1 is the fishing mortality of cohort c in year t-1. This age 
structured model is quite standard and has been used recently in the bioeconomic modeling of other 
pelagic fisheries.
24 The natural mortality rate for Jack Mackerel has been estimated by IFOP to be 
0.23 (and assumed to be the same across different age cohorts)   
 
The landings, effort and fleet data comes from the IFOP database which registers the technical 
characteristics,  landings,  days  at  sea  and  other  variables  for  each  individual  industrial  vessel 
operating in this fishery. This information was obtained on a yearly basis from 1985 to 2002. Ships 
were first classified into one of nine size categories, and a pseudo panel for each size category and 
year  was  constructed  taking  the  average  of  each  variable  within  each  category  and  year.  The 
justification for using these pseudo panels instead of the individual ship data was to average out 
measurement  error  in  the  individual  data.  Also,  specifying  and  estimating  a  model  based  on 
individual ship information would have been very cumbersome for forecasting purposes.  
 
A Catch equation was estimated using the pseudo panel data. Although previous research on this 
fishery has rejected a Cobb-Douglas specification for the catch equation in favor of a translog 
                                                           
24 See, for example, Bjorndal, Ussif and Sumaila (2004).   15
specification (Peña-Torres, Basch and Vergara, 2003; Peña-Torres, Vergara and Basch, 2004), in 
this paper we use the former functional form for simplicity. In addition, having quadratic terms in 
the catch equation, as in a translog specification, may generate forecasting problems since variables 
may become negative or grow to unrealistic levels much faster than in a linear model.  
 
The estimated catch equation is presented in Table 3, where the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the annual catch (measured in tons) per vessel category. The equation was first estimated using 
Generalized Least Squares to take into account the heteroskedasticity implicit in each observation of 
the pseudo panel (since the number of individual ships in each size category and year was different). 
In  spite  of  this  estimation  strategy,  the  econometric  tests  rejected  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 




Table 3: Catch equation for Jack Mackerel 
Variable  Estimated Coefficients 
Constant    -40.5258
*** 
Dummy SC 230 to 370 m3        1.6299
***    
Dummy SC 370 to 510 m3      22.0791
***      
Dummy SC 510 to 650 m3      22.3925
***      
Dummy SC 650 to 790 m3      22.6695
***      
Dummy SC 790 to 930 m3      44.3212
***      
Dummy SC 930 to 1070 m3      44.4602
***      
Dummy SC 1070 to 1490 m3      44.6654
***      
Dummy SC above 1490 m3      44.8835
***      
Ln (days fishing)      0.5981
**      
Ln (days fishing) x SC (370-790)       0.6160
**      
Ln (days fishing) x SC (>790)      0.5606
**      
Ln (biomass Jack Mackerel)        2.7175
***      
Ln (biomass J. Mackerel) x SC (370-790)      -1.3845
***      
Ln (biomass J. Mackerel) x SC (>790)      -2.6817
***      
Dummy 1997-2000      -0.6404
***      
Dummy 2001-2002       0.3999
***      
   
Number of observations  142 
Estimation method  Feasible GLS 
R
2  ---- 
(if model estimated by GLS, R
2 is 0.94) 
Note: 
*** indicates the parameter is significant at 1% level; 
** indicates the parameter is significant at 5% level. 
 
 
                                                           
25 The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be rejected. All these results are available from the 
authors upon request.    16
In general, the larger the ship (storage capacity below 230 m3 is the excluded category) the higher 
is the constant of the catch equation. According to the parameter estimates, three broad categories of 
vessels seem to emerge: those below 370 m3 of storage capacity, those above 370 m3 but below 
790 and those above 790 m3. Within each category, the constant is very similar. 
 
Annual fishing days (our measure of fishing effort) increase catches. The elasticity of catches to 
fishing days is 0.60 for vessels below 370 m3 of storage capacity, but rises to 1,21 and 1,16 for 
ships between 370 m3 and 790 m3, and ships above 790 m3, respectively. Thus, for larger ships the 
catch equation exhibits nearly constant or slightly increasing returns to scale in fishing days. Similar 
findings are reported in Peña-Torres et al. (2003 and 2004). 
 
The biomass (calculated at the beginning of each year) is also statistically significant but its impact 
on catches diminishes as ship size increases. This is consistent with the fact that, especially for 
larger vessels, the use of electronic search equipments and the longer autonomy at sea, together with 
the  schooling  behavior  of  pelagic  fish  species,  could  imply  that  biomass  abundance  may  not 
significantly affect catches but only until the biomass is close to collapsing (Clark, 1971 and 1985).   
 
Finally, the effect of introducing the experimental fishing expeditions during the 1997-2000 period 
served, ceteris paribus, to reduce annual catches of Jack Mackerel per vessel. This result is probably 
dominated by the fact that in these expeditions ships had to undertake a number of days at sea in 
search of schools, in a pre-allocated path, without being able to fish.
26  
 
Due  to  the  estimation  method  used,  no  R
2  is  reported  for  the  Jack  Mackerel  catch  equation.
27 
However, as an indication of the fit of the model, the R
2 of estimating this model by GLS was 0.94.  
 
The estimated residuals were used to estimate the variance of the distribution of errors. Since the 
presence of heteroskedasticity was detected, a different variance was estimated for each vessel size 
category. These parameters, together with those estimated for the error distributions of the other 
equations (including the stock recruitment equation), are used further below in the Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
 
                                                           
26 Perhaps the dummy variable for this period should be interacted with days fishing if this explanation were 
true. However, for simplicity this variable was introduced in the constant of the equation.  
27 An R
2 measure is not reported by Stata for FGLS.   17
The next equation of the model is the Effort equation. That is, an equation that attempts to explain 
the number of fishing days, per year, for each vessel size category. In order to specify the effort 
equation, it is useful to develop a very simple model of effort determination.  
 
In the southern industrial pelagic fishery, there are a few companies that own most of the fleet.
28 
Therefore, each company has to decide upon the optimal use of its own fleet. Lets assume initially 
that each company hast one of each of two types of ships, that differ in terms of the marginal cost of 
effort and its catch per effort relationship (catch equation). Lets assume to start with that an ITQ 
system is in place. In this situation each company maximizes profits subject to the constraint that 
total landings are equal to the assigned quota: 
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In this model E1 and E2 are effort levels, c1 and c2 are the cost of effort functions, h1 and h2 are the 
catch equations, where 1 and 2 denote the ship type. H is the individual quota of the company. The 



















where ￿ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the restriction. Using the Cobb-Douglas catch 
equation specified above and noting that the marginal cost of effort (days fishing) is constant we 
arrive at the following equation for the determination of effort: 
 



























a a                  (1) 
 
In this equation, ￿1i and ￿2i are the coefficients of the catch equation related to the effort and 
biomass stock, respectively. Therefore, under an ITQ system the determination of the logarithm of 
                                                           
28 Unfortunately, the IFOP database did not contain a variable identifying each ship’s ownership.   18
effort will depend on all the variables that enter the catch equation, including the dummy variables 
that affect the intercept of that equation, in addition to the marginal cost of effort and as the price of 
the catch.
29  
   
What happens if no ITQ system is in place?  It is difficult to model a situation in a static model as 
the  one  specified  above.  However,  the  Olympic  Race  that  characterizes  most  TAC  regulatory 
systems will imply an increase in effort, at least as long as the fishing season is open. In our model 
above  we  can  model  this  situation  as  the  disappearance  of    the  catch  restriction  in  the  profit 
maximization problem and each firm has the incentive to increase the effort of each of his ships 
until the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. In other words, effort of each vessel would 
be determined by: 
 


























a a      (2) 
 
where the Lagrange multiplier is no longer present. In principle, we could estimate equation (1) and 
(2) separately using information for each period according to the regulation applied. However, since 
the Lagrange multiplier enters equations (1) in a non-linear form, thus requiring data intensive non-
linear techniques to estimate, and we only have two years of data for the period under ITQ, the 
estimated results will not be very reliable. Instead we estimate a single equation using a dummy 
variable for the year 2001 and another dummy variable for 2002 as a proxy for the change that the 
introduction of the ITQ system had on the determination of effort.
30 We also used another dummy 
variable for the period 1997-2000 to identify a change in the effort equation due to the closure of 
the fishery and the introduction of the experimental fishing expeditions. 
 
Effort is measured as days fishing each year, which is truncated at 0 and 365. Therefore, we apply a 
logistic transformation to the effort variable in order to makes its range equal to the real numbers. 
This transformation is given by: 
                                                           
29 The price is taken to be the average international price for a ton of fishmeal. The parameter used to relate 
catches to fishmeal production is 0.22. That is, a ton of catch will produce on average 0.22 tons of fishmeal. 
30  The  reason  why  we  used  two  dummy  variables  for  2001  and  2002  instead  of  one  variable  for  both 
years¾as in the catch equation¾ is that in the year 2001 the ITQ were introduced in February and the effort 
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where I1997-2000 is a dummy variable that takes a value of (2/12) in 1997, one between 1998 and 2000 
and zero all other years.
31 The variable I2001 takes a value of one for year 2001 and I2002 a value of 
one for 2002, n measures the number of ships that operated each year, and B is the Jack Mackerel 
biomass at the beginning of the year. It must be noted that the first three parameters were estimated 
for each category of ships in the panel, while the rest are common to all size categories. 
 
One final point, the parameters of the effort equation (3) are related to the parameters of the catch 
equations. Estimating a simultaneous equation model with the cross equation restrictions imposed 
could increase efficiency in the econometric estimation of these parameters. However, this approach 
was  not  undertaken  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  catch  equation  parameters  enter  the  effort 
determination equation in a non-linear way, making the estimation procedures quite cumbersome. 
Second, any misspecification in any of the two equations would bias the other equations. Thus, a 
less efficient, but still consistent, single equation estimation strategy was followed. The results are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
As in the catch equation the effort equation was first estimated using Generalized Least Squares to 
take into account the heteroskedasticity implicit in each observation of the pseudo panel (since the 
number of individual ships in each size category and year was different). In spite of this estimation 
strategy,  the  econometric  tests  rejected  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  additional  heteroskedasticity. 
Therefore, our preferred results were estimated using Feasible GLS.
32 
                                                           
31 The closure of the fishery and the introduction of experimental fishing expeditions was in November 1997. 
Thus for that year this reform was applied only 2 months and thus the dichotomous dummy variable takes this 
value for that year.  
32 The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be rejected.     20
Table 4: Estimation results for the Effort equation 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant      5.75173
*** 
Dummy SC230-370 m3      1.19230
*** 
Dummy SC370-510 m3      1.56460
*** 
Dummy SC510-650 m3      2.12799
*** 
Dummy SC650-790 m3      2.22741
*** 
Dummy SC790-930 m3      2.03350
*** 
Dummy SC930-1070 m3      2.39706
*** 
Dummy SC1070-1490 m3      2.38383
*** 
Dummy SC>1490 m3      2.38855
*** 
I1997-2000    -2.74044
*** 
I1997-2000* SC230- 370 m3      1.91950
*** 
I1997-2000* SC370-510 m3      2.03953
*** 
I1997-2000* SC510-650 m3      2.00584
*** 
I1997-2000* SC650-790 m3      2.05365
*** 
I1997-2000* SC790-930 m3      2.06975
*** 
I1997-2000* SC930-1070 m3      2.09921
*** 
I1997-2000* SC1070-1490 m3      2.12537
*** 
I1997-2000* SC>1490 m3      2.59840
*** 
I2001    -3.63447
** 
I2001* SC230-370 m3  -0.54597    
I2001* SC370-510 m3  -0.03133 
I2001* SC510-650 m3   0.57840 
I2001* SC650-790 m3   1.17835 
I2001* SC790-930 m3   2.08638 
I2001* SC930-1070 m3   2.28212 
I2001* SC1070-1490 m3    2.70529
* 
I2001* SC>1490 m3    2.84159
* 
I2002      -3.81678
*** 
I2002* SC230-370 m3   0.09076 
I2002* SC370-510 m3   1.31505 
I2002* SC510-650 m3      2.76347
** 
I2002* SC650-790 m3   1.87721 
I2002* SC790-930 m3       2.97860
*** 
I2002* SC930-1070 m3     2.52289
** 
I2002* SC1070-1490 m3       2.79560
*** 
I2002* SC>1490 m3       2.80141
*** 
Ln(number of ships)      -1.05056
*** 
Ln(price)       0.36993
*** 
Ln(cost per day of effort)      -0.72393
*** 
   
Number of observations  141 
Estimation method  Feasible GLS  
R
2  --- 
(if model estimated by GLS R
2 is 0.87)  
Note: 
*** indicates the parameter is significant at 1% level; 
** indicates the parameter is significant at 5% level; 
* indicates the parameter is significant at 10% level. 
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The results show that the closure of the fishery in 1997 and the introduction of the experimental 
fishing expeditions reduced the number of days fishing of ships of all categories, but relatively less 
for bigger sized ships. The introduction of ITQ’s in 2001 reduced effort by more than the closure in 
1997, and only for the largest two size categories had a relatively smaller fall in effort.
33 In 2002 the 
reduction in effort was similar to 2001 but there was more effort exerted by middle to higher sized 
ships. 
 
The results also show that the total number of ships active in the fishery reduces the effort made by 
ships in each individual category. This may be due to economies of search.
34 When there are more 
ships fishing the information on the whereabouts of schools is passed on around the fleet of the 
same company ¾and indirectly inferred by ships of other companies¾ so that less days of search 
are required with a larger fleet at sea. The price of fishmeal has a positive effect of effort exerted, as 
expected, and the cost of one day of effort has a negative effect.
35     
 
Due to  the  estimation method  used,  no R
2  is  reported  for  the effort  equation.  However,  as  an 
indication of the fit of the model, the R
2 of estimating this model by GLS was 0.87.  
 
The estimated residuals were used to estimate the variance of the distribution of errors. Since the 
presence  of  heteroskedasticity  was  detected,  a  different  variance  was  estimated  for  each  size 
category of ships. These parameters are used further below in the Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
The next two equations of the model deal with Fleet Investment dynamics. One equation is used to 
model the relative distribution of ships in each size category and the other to model the total number 
of ships active in the fishery. Together, these equations determine the number of ships in each size 
category each year.  
 
The  investment  dynamics  can  be  heuristically  modelled  as  a  two-stage  process.  First,  the 
profitability of fishing activities affects the decision of whether to retire or introduce a ship into the 
fishery. Second, if a decision has been made to introduce a new ship, its optimal size category must 
be determined. 
                                                           
33 This inference is made based on the size of the coefficient related to the 1997-2000 dummy compared to the 
2001 coefficient. Also, most of the coefficients of the interaction of the 2001 dummy with size category are 
not significantly different from 0, except for the two largest categories. 
34 Results in the same line were obtained by Peña-Torres and Basch (2000) in their estimated catch model for 
the pelagic industrial fleet which operates in Northern Chile.   22
The economic returns to fishing are inherently uncertain, especially in this pelagic fishery geared 
towards the production of fishmeal. Being a traded commodity its price is determined on the world 
market and can be quite volatile depending on global economic activity. On the other hand, the 
environmental  uncertainties  related to fish  stock  abundance,  migration  and  other  effects  makes 
catching fish an uncertain activity in itself. Additionally, fleet investment usually implies a high 
degree of value specificity and therefore ex-post sunk costs. 
 
Modern  investment  theory  predicts  that  the  decision  to  undertake  or  abandon  a  value-specific 
investment project under uncertainty will depend on certain variables reaching a threshold level.
36 
In  particular,  if  we  define  E(V/t)  as  the  expected  net  present  value  of  an  investment  project 
estimated using all the information available until t, then theory predicts that the project will be 
undertaken when: 
 
( ) 0 / > >a t V E  
 
for some positive parameter ￿. Notice that under uncertainty an investor in a value-specific project 
will decide to undertake an investment when the net present value of this investment is strictly 
above zero by a certain amount. The reason for this is that there is an option value of postponing an 
investment decision until more information is available. Thus only when the net present value of 
undertaking the project now is above this option value will the decision be made to go ahead with 
the project. The analogous condition for abandoning a project is: 
 
( ) 0 / < < b t V E . 
 
Under uncertainty an investor will not abandon a project when the net present value reaches zero, 
only when this value is sufficiently below zero. When the expected value of the project is between ￿ 
and ￿, the optimal  decision  is  not  to  invest, if  the project  has  not  yet  begun,  and to  continue 
operating, if the project is already in operation. 
 
The particular values of  ￿ and ￿ will depend on various factors, including the properties of the 
stochastic process followed by the underlying random variables that affect the value of the project 
(in particular the variance of the distributions), the amount of the required initial investment and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
35 The cost of effort only includes the variable fuel, labor and material costs of fishing trips.   23
possible  exit  costs.  These  last  costs  include  payments  required  if  operation  ceases  (severance 
payments for example) as well as any sunk cost of the project.  
 
As shown by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the higher is the amount of the initial investment, the higher 
the values of ￿ and ￿. Thus, from the point of view of the current model, these parameters should be 
allowed to differ for different ship size categories.  
 
Assume that investors observe the results of each ship in year t. They can then form an idea of the 
relative profitability of each type of vessel. Assume for the moment that firms can renew their fleet 
each year without any adjustment cost. Then, each firm will decide to have a fleet composed of 
ships type i, where: 
 
0 ) / ( ) / ( > - = - j j j i i t V E Max t V E a a
 
 
where j indexes all types of ships. In other words, they will choose the most profitable size category 
among  those  available.  The  econometrician  does  not  directly  observe  E(Vj/t)  –  ￿j  but  he  does 
observe a proxy for this value in the form of the current profitability of each type of ship: 
 
( ) jt j jt t V E e p + = /
 
 
where ￿jt is the profitability of ship type j in year t and ￿jt is an error assumed to be independently 
distributed among size categories and year. Besides measurement error, this error term can also be 
attributed to the possible dispersion of information as regards the relative profitability of each type 
of ship among firms.
37 Therefore, the probability that ship type i is the preferred type in year t is 
given by: 
 
[ ] [ ] jt j jt j it i it Max e a p e a p - + = - + Pr
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
36 For a modern exposition of the theory see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
37 In order for current profitability to proxy for the value of the project, the underlying stochastic variables 
must have the Markov property. That is, the expected value of each variable for the next period must be a 
function of the value of that variable in the current period only, not past values of these variables. In general, 
the stochastic processes of commodity prices (such as fishmeal) have this property.     24
If it is further assumed that the ￿jt have an extreme value distribution, then the probability of that 
ship type i is the preferred type in year t has a multinomial logistic distribution: 
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The above expression gives the ideal relative frequency of ship type i in year t assuming there are 



















        
If we define a base category (ship type b, for example), then a simple transformation of the above 
equation leads to: 
 
( ) ( ) b i bt it bt it f f a a p p - + - = -
* * ln ln
. 
 
This last condition states that the logarithm of the relative ideal frequency of ships type i and b will 
depend on the relative profitability of each type of ship and the relative value of the threshold 
investment parameters.  
 
Until now it was assumed that there were no adjustment costs. This is clearly unrealistic. A better 
specification would posit that firms face adjustment costs and thus adjust their capital stock only 
partially each period in the direction of their optimal composition. Thus, the fleet composition in the 
current  period  is  equal  to  last  period’s  composition  plus  an  adjustment  due  to  the  difference 
between last period’s optimal and real relative fleet composition:  
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where the parameter ￿ measures the speed of adjustment. This parameter must be between 0 (very 
slow adjustment) and 1 (very fast adjustment). Substituting for the condition of optimal relative 
fleet composition gives the following model: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 ln ln 1 ln ln - - - - - × - + - + - × = - bt it b i bt it bt it f f f f l a a p p l
. 
 
Thus, the model estimated was: 
 
( ) [ ] it bt it bt it i bt it f f f f e b p p b b + - × + - × + = - - - - - 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 ln ln ln ln
. 
 
Since each variable is defined relative to the base category, which we defined as the category of 
ships between 510 and 650 m3 of storage capacity, the observations for the base category are not 
used in the estimation.  
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fm is the price of fishmeal in year t, ct
fm is the cost of processing fishmeal in year t, Lit is total 
landings (including species other than Jack Mackerel) by the average ship of category i in year t, ￿ 
is a technical parameter to convert tons of fish into fishmeal, cit
E is the cost per unit of effort, Eit is 
the effort level (days fishing per year) by the average ship of category i in year t, cit
FC is the fixed 
cost related to ships of type i in year t (including routine maintenance costs) and Ii is the investment 
cost of a ship type i. 
 
All the cost information was constructed from company data and expert opinions for the period 
1985  to  2002.  The investment  cost  for  each  type  of  vessel  was  estimated  based  on  published 
information in trade journals as well as expert opinion. Due to insufficient information this cost 
does not vary by year. The fishmeal price is the yearly average price of fishmeal exports according 
to the international trade statistics of the Central Bank of Chile. The ￿ parameter was set to the 
average over the 1985 to 2002 period, which was 0.22.          
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The estimation results for our preferred model are presented in Table 5. Intermediate results showed 
that a category specific intercept was rejected in favor of a common intercept, which in any case is 
not statistically significant. This implies that the parameter ￿ is very similar across ship categories. 
In addition, using the relative profitability of two years ago gave a better fit than using the relative 
profitability lagged one year. This may be due to a longer than expected lag between the decision to 
invest and the time new ships become operational. The parameter on the lagged relative frequencies 
implies a relatively low ￿ of about 0,2.
38 Thus, adjustment to the preferred fleet configuration is 
quite slow. Finally, a dummy taking a value of 1 in the years 2001 and 2002 was included.
39 The 
value of the estimated coefficient associated with this variable implies that the introduction of ITQs 
changed increased the relative attractiveness of ships of categories different from the base category. 
    
Table 5: Estimated results for the Fleet Composition equation  
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant  0.063237   
ln(pit-2)-ln(pbt-2)      0.611248
*** 
Ln(fit-1)-Ln(fbt-1)      0.802706
*** 
Dummy 2001-2002      0.484723
*** 
   
Number of observations  107 
Estimation method  OLS 
R
2  0.73 
Note: 
*** indicates the parameter is significant at 1% level; 
** indicates the parameter is significant at 5% level; 
* indicates the parameter is significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The final equation of the model is the one determining the Number of ships in the fishery. As in the 
previous equation, a standard partial adjustment model was specified for the total number of vessels 
active in the fishery. In addition, the average profitability among the fleet lagged two periods was 
included as an explanatory variable plus a dummy variable for the 2001 and 2002 period.
40 The 
results are shown on Table 6. 
 
The speed of adjustment of the fleet size is quite slow, with a parameter of 0.25. The average 
profitability does affect the fleet size. The introduction of the ITQ system in the 2001 to 2002 
period served to lower the number of ships active in the fishery. This is to be expected since firms 
                                                           
38 ￿ is equal to (1-￿2). 
39 A dummy variable for the 1997-2000 period was also tested but it was not statistically significant.  
40 Once again a dummy for the 1997-2000 period was not significant, implying that the introduction of ITQs 
in 2001 had a significant impact on investment behavior while the closure and subsequent experimental 
fishing experience did not affect investment behavior compared to the previous regime.    27
under an ITQ system have no incentives for ‘racing for fish’ and instead can optimize the planning 
and timing of their operations. Related to this, prior to the ITQ system firms had an incentive to 
maintain licensed ships active (even operating them just for few days a year
41) in case the fishery 
was later reopened.     
 
 
Table 6: Estimated results for the Fleet Size equation  
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant    1.113527 
ln(Average ￿t-2)    0.516352 
Ln(nt-1)    0.750917 
Dummy 2001-2002  -0.372486 
   
Number of observations  16 
Estimation method  OLS 
R
2  0.91 
Note: 
*** indicates the parameter is significant at 1% level; 
** indicates the parameter is significant at 5% level; 
* indicates the parameter is significant at 10% level. 
 
 
A complete summary of our model of the southern pelagic Jack Mackerel fishery is presented in 
Table 7. The exogenous variables of the model are the price of fishmeal, all the cost and investment 
figures, the fish to fishmeal conversion parameter ￿, the landings of other species (OH), the non-
modelled landings of Jack Mackerel (NIH)
42, the natural mortality parameter M, and the cohort 
catchability parameters ￿. The endogenous variables include the recruitment of Jack Mackerel, its 
harvest and its biomass, as well as fleet’s effort, size and composition.  
 
In order to evaluate the performance of the model, the fitted values were compared to the real 
values of the endogenous variables during the 1987 to 2002 period.
43 The results are presented in 
Figures 3 to 10. It can be seen that the fitted values for aggregate Jack Mackerel catches, total 
Biomass,  and  the  number  of ships  in  the  fishery  replicate  quite  well  the  evolution  of  the  real 
variables. What is even more interesting is that fleet composition model tracks fairly well the true 
composition of the fleet. Figures 6 to 10 show the real versus fitted fleet composition for the years 
1987, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2002. The model tracks quite well the evolution of fleet composition, 
except perhaps for the year 2002, where the model predicts a higher proportion of larger ships as 
                                                           
41 By doing so firms kept valid the fishing licenses of their vessels. 
42 These include the catches by the international fleet outside the EEZ, catches by the non-industrial fleet in 
the southern region, and catches in other regions of the country. 
43 Because the profitability is lagged two periods in two of the equations, the model starts in 1987.    28
compared to what happened in reality. However, for such complex phenomena the model is quite 
satisfactory.  
 
Table 7: Summary of the complete bioeconomic model 
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Identity, not estimated. ￿ct are the 
cohort-specific  exploitation 
patterns.  These  parameters  were 
set equal to the average between 
1985 and 1996 for that period and 
to the average between 85-02 for 
the  other  years.  Ft  has  to  be 
resolved  numerically  for  each 
year.  NIH  are  the  non-modelled 
catches  of  Jack  Mackerel, 
including  international  catch, 
catch  by  the  non-industrial  fleet 
and  catches  in  other  regions. 
These were set to their observed 
values during the period. 
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Estimated (Table 5). The variable 
fit  is  the  proportion  of  each 
category  of  ships  in  the  overall 
fleet.  The  base  category  was 
defined as ships between 510 and 
650 m
3 of storage capacity. 
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Estimated (Table 6). 
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Given the performance of the model in replicating past behavior, in the next section we use it to 
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Figure 5: Real versus fitted Fleet Size 

























































































































































































5.  Monte Carlo simulations 
 
The model was used to generate 100 simulations for the period 2001 to 2020.
44 For each simulation, 
draws  were  taken  from  the  error  distributions  of the  estimated  equations.  There  were  20  such 
distributions, 9 (one for each ship category) for the catch equation, 9 (one for each ship category) 
for the effort equation, 1 for the fleet composition equation and 1 for the fleet size equation. All 
distributions  were  assumed  to  be  log-normally  distributed  with  a  standard  error  equal  to  the 
estimated  value  from  the  econometric  results  and  mean  zero  of  the  logarithm  of  the  variable. 
Although formal tests usually reject the null hypothesis of log-normality, a graphical inspection of 
the residuals of each equation reveals that it is a good approximation. The alternative would have 
been to have taken samples from the empirical distribution of residuals for each equation. However, 
since the sample period is quite short (1985 to 2002), for most cases this distribution has few data 
points and would probably have made the results more erratic. 
 
In order to make simulations certain assumptions have to be made with respect to the exogenous 
variables of the model. With respect to the price of fishmeal, it was set to US$581 each year, which 
corresponds to the average real price between 1985 and 2002. Figure 11 shows the real price of 
fishmeal (constant 2002 prices) during the whole sample period. Notice that in the year 2001 and 
2002 we did not use the true observed price but rather the average over 1985 to 2002. The reason is 
that to evaluate the introduction of the ITQ system simulations had to start in 2001. Thus, our 
results are from the viewpoint of evaluating the introduction of this system in the year 2000. 
 
It can be seen that this price has a cyclical behavior. Although future research should attempt to 
model this price in order to project into the future, in this study it was held constant at the sample 
period  average. One  possible  justification  for  this  approach is  that  the  data  on  costs  was  held 
constant at the 2002 level in all simulations. There was scant information to model the evolution of 
future costs (including fuel prices and investment costs), so the only reasonable assumption was to 
maintain their last observed level. Maintaining prices constant is consistent with this treatment for 
cost variables.  
                                                           
44 Although more simulations would have been ideal, in one scenario presented below (with TAC) the model 
takes 51 seconds to resolve one simulation. This is due to the fact that numerical techniques have to be used to 
find  the  effort  and  F  parameter  in  each  of  the  18  years  of  the  simulation.  Therefore,  more  than  100 
simulations would be quite costly in terms of research time.    34
Figure 11: International price of fishmeal (US$ of 2002/ton) 













The catches of other species by the industrial fleet in this fishery (Anchovy, Sardines and others) 
were projected to be constant each year and equal to the average catches by this fleet over the 
period  1995-2000.  Taking  earlier  years  into  account  would  distort  results  because  in  the  late 
eighties and early nineties there were significant pelagic catches in the southern fishery which later 
disappeared.  
 
The  parameter  which  converts  fish  into  fishmeal,  ￿,  was  maintained  at  0.22  throughout  the 
projection  period.  The  cohort  exploitation  parameters,  ￿c,  were  held  constant  and  equal  to  the 
average for each cohort over the 1985-2002 period. The catch of Jack Mackerel by the international 
fleet, the non-industrial fleet in the fishery, or caught in other parts of the country was set to be 
23.5% of the total industrial catch. This parameter is equal to the average over the 1995-2002 
period.  Finally,  the  natural  mortality  of  Jack  Mackerel  was  held  constant  at  0.23,  the  current 
estimated level.  
 
The allocative efficiency  benefits of the ITQ system are measured as the difference in the net 
present value of producer’s surplus from simulations where this system is imposed compared to the 
a counterfactual regime without ITQs. The price of fishmeal is assumed to be exogenous to this 
fishery and determined in the international market. Therefore, consumer surplus is not affected by 
the events in this fishery and is not relevant for the evaluation of the introduction of the ITQ system. 










































































where r is the discount rate, and N is the useful life of the vessel. The last expression converts the 
investment cost of ship type i into an annuity. This way of treating investment costs is correct only 
if there is no sunk cost associated with the current fleet operating in the fishery. In other words, it 
assumes there is a perfect secondary or rental market for these vessels. Although this may not seem 
very realistic, it was the only reasonable assumption to make. Otherwise, the optimal replacement 
of existing vessels would have had to be modelled, something that goes beyond the reaches of the 
present study (we do not have information on currently operating vessels’ age). In case that some 
sunk cost is associated with the operating fleet, our calculations of the yearly producer surplus 
should then be understood as a conservative (lower bound) estimate. 
 
Producer surplus was aggregated over all types of vessels for each year and then discounted at a 
10% rate to compute the net present value of producer surplus for the fishery under each regulatory 
regime. The useful life of all vessels was assumed to be 15 years.  
 
The definition of a counterfactual regulatory regime is not straightforward. In this study it is taken 
to be as a value of zero for the dummy variables for the years 2001 and 2002 in each equation. In 
other words, we assume that these dichotomous variables capture all the relevant behavioral and 
economic effects of the ITQ system. This assumption is not without problems, however. In 2001, a 
TAC was imposed on the fishery when the ITQs were introduced. How do we know that the 2001 
and 2002 dummy variables are not partially capturing the effects of this specific TAC instead of the 
ITQ system?  
 
The reason we are fairly confident that these variables are mainly capturing the effects of ITQs, 
instead of the TAC, is that total catches are very similar from 1998 to 2002 (See Figure 3). Thus, 
the formal introduction of a TAC in 2001 did not seem to change the level of aggregate catches that 
the authorities were allowing earlier. However, the sharp fall in the number of ships active in the 
fishery did not occur until 2001. Thus, before that year the fleet was constrained by an informal   36
TAC (through the control of the fishing expeditions) of a similar level as after 2001, but it was not 
until 2001 with the introduction of ITQs that firms optimized their fleet and operations.   
 
Another complication is raised by the presence of TACs in the fishery after 2001. What should be 
the level of TACs from 2003 to 2020? In this paper as our base scenario we assume that from 2003 
to 2020, a TAC similar to current levels is imposed for each  year. The official TAC for Jack 
Mackerel  was  1,450,000  tons  and  1,488,500  tons  in  2003  and  2004  respectively.  These limits 
include all catches of the resource, not just from the Southern pelagic industrial fleet. For this fleet, 
the relevant TAC was close to 1,100,000 tons each year and this was the value used for all years.
45 
 
One final comment before presenting the results: It is possible that the stock collapses to zero in 
some scenario. In this case, Jack Mackerel catches are zero from then on, but the fleet remains 
active catching other resources. The fall in profitability that this implies will gradually reduce the 
size of the fleet.   
 
5.1 Results  
 
Table 9 presents the results for a TAC of 1.1 million tons for each year. Since the TAC is the same 
for each simulation, the catch and stock dynamics are identical with and without the ITQ system. 
Thus, their corresponding averages over the 100 simulations are also the same. From the results it 
can be seen that the biomass increases at the beginning of the projection period and later falls.  
 
The main difference between both scenarios is that under an ITQ system the number of ships in the 
fishery remains relatively constant, even decreasing slightly. On the other hand, without the ITQ 
system the number of ships increases dramatically.
46 This in turn implies that the net producer 
surplus from the fishery is about US$366 million higher under an ITQ system than without it.   
 
                                                           
45 In each simulation the model was resolved by finding the level of effort that made aggregate catches equal 
to the TAC. This had to be done numerically.   
46 In practice, the initial unemployment triggered by the reduction in the number of operating ships (under the 
real ITQ system) has later been partially counteracted by increases in the number of regular jobs in the fish 
processing sector, the latter being the result of ITQ-triggered changes in the final productive mix towards 
higher value added processing activities (which are also more labor intensive than fishing effort activities). 
Unfortunately, we had no access to more detailed information about ITQ-triggered effects upon labor markets 
and final processing production.   37
 




Another interesting result (not shown in the table) is that in the absence of the ITQ system the fleet 
composition reverts to a higher proportion of smaller vessels relative to the larger vessels that 
remain under an ITQ system.   
 
 
Table 10: Results for the scenario with a limit on the number of ships 
Note: because this scenario involved running the Monte Carlo simulations once more, the results for all 
variables are different from the previous table. 
Average stocks (tons) 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 7.715.781            12.945.324          18.208.657          17.526.620          14.665.986         
Standard deviation 421.723                      1.886.806                   2.329.283                   2.062.117                   2.113.348                  
Without ITQ 7.715.781            12.945.324          18.208.657          17.526.620          14.665.986         
Standard deviation 421.723                      1.886.806                   2.329.283                   2.062.117                   2.113.348                  
Number of simulations with stocks colapsing to zero
With ITQ -                      
Without ITQ -                      
Average Catch (tons) 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000           
Standard deviation 0                                 -                               -                               -                               -                              
Without ITQ 1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000           
Standard deviation -                               -                               -                               0                                 -                              
Average number of ships 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 130                     43                       48                       49                       47                      
Standard deviation 0                                 7                                 9                                 9                                 8                                
Without ITQ 130                     214                     408                     467                     471                    
Standard deviation 0                                 31                               67                               71                               71                              
Net present value of producer surplus (US$)
With ITQ 874.257.009        Standard deviation 12.027.963                
Without ITQ 508.657.612        Standard deviation 77.498.597                
Mean Difference 365.599.397       
Average stocks (tons) 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 7.681.214            13.056.295          17.916.382          17.404.311          15.271.030         
Standard deviation 418.658                      2.105.314                   2.368.558                   2.022.964                   2.126.406                  
Without ITQ 7.681.214            13.056.295          17.916.382          17.404.311          15.271.030         
Standard deviation 418.658                      2.105.314                   2.368.558                   2.022.964                   2.126.406                  
Number of simulations with stocks colapsing to zero
With ITQ -                      
Without ITQ -                      
Average Catch (tons) 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000           
Standard deviation 0                                 0                                 0                                 -                               0                                
Without ITQ 1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000            1.100.000           
Standard deviation -                               -                               -                               -                               0                                
Average number of ships 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 130                     43                       46                       48                       47                      
Standard deviation 0                                 6                                 8                                 8                                 7                                
Without ITQ 130                     132                     132                     132                     132                    
Standard deviation 0                                 -                               -                               -                               -                              
Net present value of producer surplus (US$)
With ITQ 874.021.057        Standard deviation 11.783.164                
Without ITQ 750.569.558        Standard deviation 27.499.146                
Mean Difference 123.451.499         38
The evolution of the fleet size may not be very credible. Before the fleet reaches a size above the 
pre-2001  licensed  ships  it  is  probable  that  the  authorities  would  try  to  avoid  additional  entry. 
Therefore, we also ran the model with a limit of 132, the number of active vessels before the 2001 
reform. The results are presented in Table 10. 
 
Clearly, a limit on the number of ships increases the economic benefits of the pre-reform scenario. 
The net benefits of introducing the ITQ system falls to US$123 million, still a significant figure.  
 
Finally, in Table 11 the results are presented for a scenario where the TAC is raised to 1.300.000 
tons per year after 2002. During 2001 and 2002 the TAC is maintained at 1.100.000 tons since this 
is very close to the actual levels set for these years by the authorities. The limit on the total number 
of vessels in the fishery is also maintained as in the previous scenario. 
 




In this last scenario the benefits of the ITQ system falls to US$121 million. Thus, the evaluation of 
the benefits of a TAC system does not seem to vary greatly with plausible changes in the TAC 
level.  Other  simulations  undertaken  with  different  TACs  show  the  same  result:  the  difference 
between regulatory systems is not very sensitive to different levels of the global quota. However, 
the absolute level of economic benefits under each scheme does change significantly. This points 
Average stocks (tons) 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 7,651,285            12,357,517     16,560,413     17,215,714     15,559,881    
Standard deviation 312,758                       1,621,784              2,312,173              1,931,391              2,054,637             
Without ITQ 7,651,285            12,357,517     16,560,413     17,215,714     15,559,881    
Standard deviation 312,758                       1,621,784              2,312,173              1,931,391              2,054,637             
Number of simulations with stocks colapsing to zero
With ITQ -                          
Without ITQ -                          
Average Catch (tons) 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 1,100,000            1,300,000       1,300,000       1,300,000       1,300,000      
Standard deviation 0.031                           -                            -                            -                            -                           
Without ITQ 1,100,000            1,300,000       1,300,000       1,300,000       1,300,000      
Standard deviation 0                                  -                            0                           0                           -                           
Average number of ships 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020
With ITQ 130                      45                   47                   50                   51                  
Standard deviation 0.00                             7.34                       8.00                      7.22                      9.16                     
Without ITQ 130                      132                 132                 132                 132                
Standard deviation 0.00                             -                            -                            -                            -                           
Net present value of producer surplus (US$)
With ITQ 1,029,401,852     Standard deviation 11,921,444           
Without ITQ 907,736,751        Standard deviation 26,506,663           
Mean Difference 121,665,101         39
out to the need of optimizing the TAC level in order to maximize the economic benefits from the 
fishery. This is undertaken with this same model in an accompanying paper by the authors (Gómez-
Lobo, Barría and Peña-Torres, 2005).   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
An ITQ system was introduced in the southern pelagic fishery of Chile in 2001. This reform had an 
immediate impact on the operation of the industrial fleet. The number of vessels active in the 
fishery fell from 132 in 2000 to 65 in 2002. Among the benefits of reform are the lower capital and 
operating costs of eliminating the chronic over investment that affected this fishery. In addition, the 
elimination  of  the  Olympic  race  also  allowed  fishermen  to  make  a  better  planning  of  their 
operations, giving them the option to decide whether or not to catch less fish in a given trip, thus 
improving the average quality of landings and hence increasing the proportion of landings to be 
allocated towards the higher value added segments of the industry.  
 
In order to obtain a preliminary estimate of direct allocative efficiency benefits of the ITQ reform, a 
bioeconomic  model  of  the  fishery  capable  of  simulating  the  future  behavior  of  biological  and 
economic variables under different regulatory systems is needed. To this end in this paper we used a 
bioeconomic model estimated econometrically using past data of the fishery. This model reproduces 
quite well the true evolution of key variables between 1987 and 2002. We use the model to simulate 
several scenarios using Monte Carlo Techniques. The results indicate that the direct operational 
benefits of the reform are substantial. The net present value of benefits varies between US$123 to 
$366 million dollars between 2001 and 2020, depending on the particular assumptions used in each 
scenario. This range of net present values implies a range of yearly net benefit gains which are 
equivalent to between 6% - 19% of the total yearly exported value by the Chilean southern pelagic 
fishery. 
 
The way the  ITQ system was introduced in Chile is also of interest. From December 1997 to 
December 2000 the fishery was closed for biological reasons. However, the authorities organized 
‘Experimental’ fishing expeditions in order to maintain the fleet active but under very controlled 
operational conditions. These expeditions worked informally as a pseudo individual quota system. 
This experience allowed fishermen to learn the benefits of such a system, which was instrumental in 
facilitating the formal introduction of an ITQ system later. Perhaps this ‘didactic’ approach used in 
Chile may be replicated in other countries wishing to introduce an ITQ system.     40
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Species  Fishery  Geographical area 
Central Southern Pelagic  V to X región 
Northern Pelagic
  III to IV region 
Jack Maquerel (Trachurus 
murphyi) 
Northern Pelagic
a/  I to II region 
Spanish Sardine (Sardinops 
sagax) 
Northern Pelagic
a/  I to II region 
Central Southern Pelagic  V to X region  Anchovy 
(Engraulis ringens)  Northern Pelagic
a/  I to II region 
Common Sardine (Clupea 
bentincki) 









Central Southern demersal  V to X region 
Spanish Sardine (Sardinops 
sagax) 
Northern Pelagic  III to IV region 
Anchovy 
(Engraulis ringens) 
Northern Pelagic  III to IV region 
Hake  
(Macruronus magellanicus) 
Southern demersal  XI to XII region 
Southern Hake (Merluccius 
australis) 
Southern demersal  41º28,6 L.S. to 
57ºL.S. 
Conger eel  
(Genypterus blacodes) 
Southern demersal  41º28,6 L.S. to 
57ºL.S. 
Three finned Hake 
(Micromesistius australis) 
Southern demersal  41º28,6 L.S. to XII 
region 
Common Hake (Merluccius 
gayi) 
Central Southern Demersal  IV region to 
41º28,6 L.S. 
Nylon prawn (Heterocarpus 
reedi) 
  II to VIII region 
Yellow lobster 
(Cervimunida johni) 
  III to IV region 
Landings 
from 1999 to 
2000 
Red lobster (Pleuroncodes 
monodon) 
  I to IV region 
Source: Law 19.713. Notes: 
a/ Introduced in December 2002. 
 
 
 
 